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QUILLEN v. KELLEY
have sought some 'inconsistent provision or word which
would exclude its application'. The decisions of this
Court require that we adopt the restrictive construc-
tion which gives effect to the natural and primary
meaning of the words used, rather than an arbitrary
meaning by an artificial rule of law." 2
On the facts of the Bowman case," there is little doubt that
the rule in Shelley's case was not applicable there, but what
is of interest in that case is not the court's decision, but its
reaffirmation of disfavor toward the rule and its clear state-
ment of intention to do all possible to avoid applying it.
Confronted in the Burnham case 4 with a question of first
impression in Maryland, the court chose to adhere to a
view which made possible the application of the rule.
MARTIN A. DYEm
Defaulting Vendee's Right To Recover Part Payment
On A Contract To Purchase Real Estate
Quillen v. Kelley'
Plaintiffs brought an action for the return of their part
payment of the price of the "Hotel Royalton" which they
had contracted to purchase together with certain chattels
therein.
The plaintiffs and a Mrs. Cook as vendees and the Kel-
leys as vendors executed the contract September 1, 1952,
the purchase price of the hotel being $257,500. The vendors
were to receive a net amount of $245,000 for the property
and $12,500 commission was to be paid to Mrs. Cook, a
broker. At the time of signing the contract, the vendees
paid the vendors $15,000 as the contract provided. A fur-
ther sum of $20,000, due November 1, 1952, was paid in
full at that time.2 The plaintiffs requested that the next
payment, $40,000 due in February, 1953, be reduced to
$10,000, apparently because Mrs. Cook, one of the three
vendees, had died insolvent. The defendants refused, and
-Ibid, 350.
"Ibid.
"217 Md. 507, 144 A. 2d 80 (1958).
1216 Md. 396, 140 A. 2d 517 (1958).
2 On November 1, -the vendees paid the vendors $12,500 and the vendors
gave vendees a credit of $7,500 for the balance due Mrs. Cook as her com-
mission.
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neither this nor any subsequent payment was ever made.
The defendants have always remained in possession, but
there is no evidence that they were not ready or willing to
complete the contract upon plaintiffs' performance.
The lower court's dismissal of the plaintiffs' petition was
affirmed by the Court of Appeals.
The plaintiffs argued, although they were in substantial
default, that to allow defendants to retain their $22,500
part payments would be inequitable and result in the un-
just enrichment of the defendants, especially as there was
no provision in the contract for a forfeiture. They asserted
that their breach was neither wilful nor deliberate. The
Court referred to the common law rule which allows the
vendor to retain part payments made by the defaulting
vendee on the purchase price where the vendor is ready
and willing to fulfill his part of the contract, even if such
part payment results in a profit to the vendor by reason
of the default. The Court also considered Section 357 of
the RESTAm T OF CONTRACTS,3 which would permit resti-
tution in favor of a party who is himself in default on a
contract where the value of his part performance exceeds
the harm caused by his default. The Court held that even
if, in a proper case, they were to adopt the more liberal
view of the RESTATEmENT, which they did not decide, the
plaintiffs could not recover because it was not shown that
the defendants had failed or refused to perform, nor had
a2 RESTATEMENT, CONTRACTS (1932) §357.
"Restitution in Favor of a Plaintiff Who 18 Himself In Default.
(1) Where the defendant fails or refuses to perform his contract and
is justified therein by the plaintiff's own breach of duty or non-perform-
ance of a condition, but the plaintiff has rendered a part performance
under the contract that is a net benefit to the defendant, the plaintiff
can get judgment, except as stated in Subsection (2), for the amount
of such benefit in excess of the harm that he has caused to the defen-
dant by his own breach, in no case exceeding a ratable proportion of
the agreed compensation, if (a) the plaintiff's breach or non-perform-
ance is not wilful and deliberate; or (b) the defendant, with knowledge
that the plaintiff's breach of duty or non-performance of condition has
occurred or will thereafter occur, assents to the rendition of the part
performance, or accepts the benefit of it, or retains property received
although its return in specie is still not unreasonably difficult or In-
jurious.
(2) The plaintiff has no right to compensation for his part perform-
ance if it is merely a payment of earnest money, or if the contract
provides that it may be retained and it is not so greatly in excess of the
defendant's harm that the provision Is rejected as imposing a penalty.
(3) The measure of the defendant's benefit from the plaintiff's part
performance is the amount by which he has been enriched as a result
of such performance unless the facts are those stated in Subsection (b),
in which case it is the price fixed by the contract for such part perform-
ance, or, if no price is so fixed, a ratable proportion of the total con-
tract price."
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the plaintiffs proved the amount they were entitled to
recover.
The RESTATEMENT rule4 may well be an easing of the
strict "rule of forfeiture" if we view the latter as embodied
in the early New York case of Ketchum v. Evertson,5 which
held that the defaulting vendee could not recover any pay-
ments under the contract for the sale of realty, even where
the vendor had, subsequent to the vendee's default, dis-
abled himself from performing by selling the property.
The New York Court said:
"It would be an alarming doctrine, to hold, that the
plaintiffs might violate the contract, and, because they
chose to do so, make their own infraction of the agree-
ment the basis of an action for money had and re-
ceived. Every man who makes a bad bargain, and has
advanced money upon it, would have the same right
to recover it back that the plaintiffs have. The de-
fendant's subsequent sale of the land does not alter
the case; the plaintiffs had not only abandoned the
possession, but expressly refused to proceed, and re-
nounced the contract. To say that the subsequent
sale of the land gives a right to the plaintiffs to re-
cover back the money paid on the contract, would, in
effect, be saying, that the defendant could never sell
it, without subjecting himself to an action by the
plaintiffs. Why should he not sell? The plaintiffs re-
nounced the contract, and peremptorily refused to ful-
fill it; it was in vain, therefore, to keep the land for
them. The plaintiffs cannot, by their own wrongful
act, impose upon the defendant the necessity of re-
taining property which his exigencies may require him
to sell; this would be most unreasonable and unjust,
and is not sanctioned by any principle of law."6
However, some of the later common law decisions,
though often citing the Ketchum7 case, perhaps relax the
strict "rule of forfeiture" and would give relief where the
defendant-vendor had disabled himself from performing.
See, for example, the language of Hansbrough v. Peck:
"And no rule in respect to the contract is better
settled than this: That the party who has advanced
Loc. cit. ibid.
'13 Johns. 359, 7 Am. Dec. 384 (N.Y., 1816).
6 Ibid., 365, 387. This quote is set out in full in Great United Realty Co. v.
Lewis, 203 Md. 442, 451-2, 101 A. 2d 881 (1954).
Ibid.
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money, or done an act in part-performance of the
agreement, and then stops short and refuses to pro-
ceed to its ultimate conclusion, the other party being
ready and willing to proceed and fulfill all his stipu-
lations according to the contract, will not be permitted
to recover back what has thus been advanced or done."'
Such language seems to infer the result reached by
RESTATEMENT OF CONTRACTS, Section 357. Approximately
the same language has been used in Maryland cases,9 while
at the same time the Court refers to and quotes with seem-
ing approval the strict forfeiture doctrine of the Ketchum10
case.
The Maryland Court of Appeals in Spellman v. Dun-
dalk Co.,11 cited the Hansbrough'2 decision with approval,
and recently, in Great United Realty Co. v. Lewis,"1 found
no need in the case before it to relax the common law
rule. In that case the defaulting vendee was denied re-
covery of $700 paid on a purchase price of $6,950 for the
sale of real estate. The Court discussed the rule of Section
357 of the RESTATMmENT OF CONTRACTS but found the vendor
did not profit from the vendee's default and therefore there
was no unjust enrichment. 4
The strict common law rule and its application by the
courts has not escaped criticism. In England, the strict
doctrine has been regarded as "unsound and intolerable,' 15
and has been modified. In the United States, the majority
of the courts still follow the "rule of forfeiture," though
85 Wall. 497, 506-7 (U.S., 1866).
9 Great United Realty Co. v. Lewis, 203 Md. 442, 101 A. 2d 881 (1954);
Quillen v. Kelley, 216 Md. 396, 140 A. 2d 517 (1958).
10 Ketchum v. Evertson, 13 Johns. 359, 7 Am. Dec. 384 (N.Y., 1816).
U164 Md. 465, 471, 165 A. 192 (1933), where the Maryland Court quotes
from Davis v. Hall, 52 Md. 673, 682 (1880), quoting from Ketchum v. Evert-
son, 13 Johns. 359, 365, 7 Am. Dec. 384, 387 (N.Y., 1816).
12Hansbrough v. Peck, 5 Wall. 497, 506-7 (U.S., 1866).
18203 Md. 442, 446, 101 A. 2d 881 (1954).
"'Ibid., 449. As in the Quillen case, 216 Md. 396, 406, 140 A. 2d 517 (1958),
the Maryland Court, at 450, finds that the vendee had only paid about 10%
of the purchase price, defaulting completely on his duty to pay the remain-
ing 90%, as a result of which, the vendor sustained a loss on the property's
resale.
See Quillen v. Kelley, 216 Md. 396, 402, 140 A. 2d 517 (1958). In 31
A.L.R. 2d 8, 24, the author says:
"The English cases, and to a great extent also the Canadian ones,
establish two rules, based on the distinction between a deposit of
'earnest' money, in its nature intended as a guaranty or security that
there will be no default, and money which is paid only as purchase
money. Forfeiture of the former is ordinarily permitted as reasonable,
forfeiture of the latter not.
"The doctrine adhered to is that deposit money is ordinarily
subject for forfeiture even though the contract contains no pro-
[VOL. XIX
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the observance of the rule has been criticized by scholars
and text writers.16
It is not surprising, therefore, that the American Law
Institute attempted to clarify the rights of a defaulting
party in the RESTATEMENT OF CoNTRACTs.17 A number of
thoughtful decisions have construed Section 35718 and dis-
cussed the defaulting party's right to restitution. There are
some decisions which seem to have accepted the rationale
of Section 357.19 In each of these cases the vendor has
taken some affirmative action to extinguish the contract
relationship, as he is privileged to do upon the breach of
a constructive condition by the vendee;2" if not by declar-
ing the contract at an end or commencing his own action,
then at least by disabling himself from performing in some
way, such as selling the property to a third person.21 None
of these cases presents the situation of the Quillen case
where the defaulting vendee is asking restitution from a
vendor who apparently remains ready and willing to con-
vision on the subject nor any language peculiarly indicative of that
result ..... "
See also, Depree v. Bedrough, 4 Giff. 479, 66 Eng. Rep. 795 (1863) ; Collins
v. Stimson, L.R. 11 Q.B. Div. 142 (1883).
At 27-30 the above author continues:
"The rule of non-forfeiture of mere purchase money clearly applies
where there is no contract provision for its forfeiture, and also where
the forfeiture provision present applies only to deposit money. Even
an initial payment is not forfeitable under the English rule if it is not
designated as a deposit, or if the designation as such is construed as not
intended technically."
See also, Mayson v. Clouet, L.R. A.C. 980 (1924) where a forfeiture pro-
vision was held only to apply to deposit money; Dies v. British & Inter-
national Mining and Finance Corp., Ltd., L.R. 1 K.B. 724 (1938); Brown
v. Walsh, 45 Ont. L. 646 (1919).
Is See 134 A.L.R. 1064, 1066; 3 WILLISTON, CONTRACTS (Rev. Ed. 1936)
2225, §791; 5 WILLISTON, CONTRACTS (Rev. Ed. 1936) 4118, §1473; 5 CORBIN,
CONTRACTS (1951), §§1122, 1132, 1135.
2 RESTATEMENT, CONTRACTS (1932) §357.
l See Newcomb v. Ray, 99 N.H. 463, 114 A. 2d 882 (1955) ; Schwartz v.
Syver, 264 Wis. 526, 59 N.W. 2d 489 (1953) ; Norris v. San Mateo County
Title Co., 225 P. 2d 263 (D. Ct. App., Cal., 1950) ; Baker v. Taylor & Co.,
218 Ark. 538, 237 S.W. 2d 471 (1951).
19 Amtorg Trading Corp. v. Miehle Printing Press & Mfg. Co., 206 F. 2d 103
(2nd Cir. 1953) ; Schwasnick v. Blandin, 65 F. 2d 354 (2nd Cir. 1933);
Schwartz v. Syver, 264 Wis. 526, 59 N.W. 2d 489 (1953) ; Newcomb v. Ray,
99 N.H. 463, 114 A. 2d 882 (1955).
2 By the doctrine of constructive conditions, in cases like these, the ven-
dor's duty of performance is discharged, and if the breach by the vendee
is total, the vendor may extinguish the contract and the rights attendant
thereto, thus having his remedial rights remaining. See 3 CORBIN, CONTRACTS
(1951) 631, 632, §660; Patterson, Constructive Conditions in Contracts, 42
Col. L. Rev. 903 (1942) ; 1 RESTATEMENT, CONTRACTS (1932) §274(1).
Amtorg Trading Corp. v. Miehle 'Printing Press & Mfg. Co., 206 F. 2d
103 (2nd Cir. 1953) ; Newcomb v. Ray, 99 N.H. 463, 114 A. 2d 882 (1955);
Schwartz v. Syver, 264 Wis. 526, 59 N.W. 2d 489 (1953).
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tinue with performance of the agreement, or at most, simply
acquiesces in the vendee's default.
Under RESTATEMENT OF CONTRACTS, Section 357, it is
clear that where the vendor refuses to perform, after the
vendee's default, the vendee should have restitution of
any amount by which the vendor would be unjustly en-
riched. However, it is clearly not the intent of Section
357 to give to the defaulting party the right to terminate
the contract and accomplish the substitution of remedial
rights for contractual rights where the vendor simply
acquiesces in the vendee's default and retains the latter's
part performance, not having exercised his right to ter-
minate the contract.
In the Quillen case, the Court emphasizes the first
phrase of the RESTATEMENT OF CONTRACTS, Section 357
which states: "Where the defendant fails or refuses to per-
form his contract and is justified therein by the plaintiff's
own breach of duty .... "22 and says that since the defendant
has kept the contract in existence, being ready and willing
to perform, there is no right to restitution by the plaintiff.
The Court's position is amply supported by a previous
Maryland decision,23 a comment to section 357 of the
RESTATEMENT, 24 and by CORBIN:
"The cases denying restitution can .. .be justified
on one or more of the following grounds: (1) The de-
fendant has not rescinded and remains ready and will-
ing to perform, and still has a right to specific per-
formance by the purchaser; .... .2,
The contract in the Quillen case provided:
"Paragraph Three. That in the event the vendees
make no default in their obligation of $20,000 payable
November 1, 1952, but pay the same ... the Vendors
do hereby covenant ... to grant and convey to the
Vendees the property, real and personal, which is the
subject of this sale, by a good and sufficient deed ....
Quillen v. Kelley, 216 Md. 396, circa 403, 140 A. 2d 517 (1958).
Great United Realty Co. v. Lewis, 203 Md. 442, 446, 101 A. 2d 881 (1954).
2'2 RESTATEMENT, CONTRACTS (1932) §357, comment (b) to Subsec-
tion (1) :
"The rules stated in the present Section are applicable only in those
cases where the defendant refuses to perform as he promised and is
justified in so doing by the plaintiff's breach or non-performance. The
contract may be such that the defendant still has a right to specific
performance in full by the plaintiff; and if he insists thereon, remain-
ing able and willing to perform his part, he may keep whatever he has
received and maintain suit for the balance that is unpaid."
5 CORBIN, CONTRACTS (1951) 605, §1135.
[VOL. XIX
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"Paragraph Eleven. That no part of the property,
real or personal,... shall be surrendered or delivered
by the Vendors to the Vendees, or either of them, be-
fore the first day of February 1953, and not then un-
less and until the payment in full of the obligation
of the Vendees in the principal sum of forty thousand
dollars ($40,000) which is due and payable on the
last day of February, 1953, as hereinbefore provided."2
After satisfying the November installment of $20,000
the plaintiffs admittedly were unable to pay the $40,000
due in February. Therefore, the vendors rightfully failed
to transfer possession. It is arguable that the case did pre-
sent the situation contemplated by the first phrase of the
Restatement: "Where the defendant fails or refuses to per-
form his contract and is justified therein by the plaintiff's
own breach of duty .... On the other hand, Paragraph
Eleven of the contract can just as readily be construed as
making the $40,000 February payment a condition preced-
ent of the duty of the vendor to convey. Under such a
construction, of course, there was no duty on the vendor to
convey and therefore no failure or refusal. The latter was
the construction adopted by the Court of Appeals. Thus,
while the Court of Appeals has intimated that it may adopt
the somewhat more charitable attitude toward defaulting
contractors which RESTATEmENT, Section 357 suggests, it
apparently is content to wait for a case which presents the
matter more compellingly than those which have so far
28
arisen.
Even in that event, the question would remain whether
RESTATEm=, Section 357 is an adequate rule for all cases.
Suppose, in the Quillen case, the contract required the
vendees to perform completely before receiving possession
and that they defaulted after paying $100,000 or even
$200,000 of the purchase price. Should the decision be the
same in such a case, where the vendor simply acquiesces
in the default by the vendee?
"It is certainly true that a vendee should not be-
come entitled to the return of purchase money merely
by electing not to proceed with performance. But no
court has given the vendee such a right, since the
vendor may elect to have specific performance or
2Quillen v. Kelley, 216 Md. 396, 140 A. 2d 517 (1958), Records & Briefs,
App. to Appellants Brief, E. 8, E. 12.
2 RESTATEMENT, CONTRACTS (1932) §357(1). [Emphasis supplied.]
8 Compare J. Clark's approach in Amtorg Trading Corp. v. Miehle Print-
ing Press & Mfg. Co., 206 F. 2d 103 (2nd Cir. 1953).
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damages. If, however, the vendor acquiesces in the
abandonment of performance, it is, on principle, ques-
tionable whether, in the absence of a provision for
forfeiture which is deemed valid, he should be per-
mitted to retain all purchase money, wholly without
reference to the amount of his actual damages and in
disregard of that construction of the contract which
recognizes the distinctive nature of earnest or deposit
money."2 9
It bears noting that significant statutory0 and judicial3'
modifications have been made on the "rule of forfeiture"
-134 A.L.R. 1064, 1066. In 27 Cal. L. Rev. 583, 590-1, n. 39 (1939), in
a Comment, Vendor and Purchaser: Right of Defaulting Vendee to Resti-
tution of Installments Paid: Development and Status of the Rule of Glock
v. Howard, the author states :
"The reason given for this view is that the vendee should not be
able to defeat the vendor's right to specific performance by repudiation
or non-payment. But this reasoning seems to beg the question. The
fundamental question is whether a party innocently in default should
be allowed to recover the value of his part performance less the other
party's damages. * * * If this question is answered in the affirmative,
the fact that the vendor has the remedy of specific performance as
well as for damages should make no difference. If this question is
answered In the negative, then the defaulting purchaser cannot recover
whether the vendor is entitled to specific performance or not."
0 See NEw YORK PERSONAL PROPERTY LAW (1958 Cum. Supp.) §145a,
giving the defaulting buyer of goods the right to restitution for benefits con-
ferred under a contract of sale.
In addition, see the Uniform Sales Act, §44 [7 MD. CODE (1957), Art. 83,
§62] and the proposed Uniform Commercial Code (1957), Art. 2, §2-720.
In Maryland, see 7 MD. CODE (1957), Art. 83, §134 (1957) "Retail Install-
ment Sales Act", "Refunds of Deposits", which allows the buyer of goods to
cancel the agreement before the seller delivers or tenders the goods where
the buyer Is required to make one or more payments in addition to any
down payment to the seller who, upon such cancellation, is obligated to
refund to the buyer 90% at least of all payments made, including the down
payment.
2 MD. CODE (1957), Art. 21, §110, "Land Installment Contracts", applies
only to purchases not exceeding $15,000 and to agreements where the vendee
agrees to pay the purchase price in five or more installments exclusive of
any down payment. While it does not provide restitutionary remedies on
the vendee's deafult, it prevents the undue hardship of the common law
forfeiture.
A State providing broad legislation in this troubled area has been Cali-
fornia. See CALIF. CIVIL CODE (Deering, 1949), §3275:
"Whenever, by the terms of an obligation, a party thereto incurs a
forfeiture, or a loss in the nature of a forfeiture, by reason of his
failure to comply with its provisions, he may be relieved therefrom,
upon making full compensation to the other party, except in case of
a grossly negligent, willful, or fraudulent breach of duty."
For recent California decisions construing and granting relief under
CALIF. CIV CODE §3275, see: Baffa v. Johnson, 35 Cal. 2d 36, 216 P. 2d 13(1950) ; Freedman v. Rector, Etc., of St. Mathias Parish, 37 Cal. 2d 16, 230
P. 2d 629 (1951) ; Lucientes v. Bliss, 157 Cal. App. 2d 565, 321 P. 2d 526(1958) ; Baxter v. Prescott, 158 Cal. App. 2d 531, 322 P. 2d 1008 (1958).
1 For an enlightening survey of these areas, including sales of chattels,
construction and personal service contracts, as well as sales of realty, see
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in a number of jurisdictions and with respect to a number
of kinds of contracts. It appears that in some states the
old "rule" has been eliminated entirely.82
In the case at hand, the second reason for denying re-
lief, sufficient for the result under the most liberal doc-
trine, was that the plaintiffs failed to prove any unjust en-
richment." CoIIN and the RESTATEM T emphasize that
the vendee-plaintiff has the burden of proving the amount
of the vendor's unjust enrichment. 4 The Quillen case would
fall under COPBIN's rule of thumb that where the down
payment is no more than ten percent of the purchase price,
proof of unjust enrichment is impossible. 5
"In very many of these installment cases, the
amount actually paid by the plaintiff for the restitution
of which he sues, is a small amount in comparison with
the entire price. * * * In such cases, it is unlikely that
the amount retained by the vendor is greater than the
injury suffered by the plaintiff's breach."86
note, Patterson, Restitution For Benefits Conferred by Party In Default
Under Contract, 1942 Report of the New York Law Revision Commission,
195. In the article, Professor Patterson, at 204 notes that:
"The doctrine of constructive conditions, with its admirable method
of indirectly sanctioning the performance of promises by giving one
or both parties a privilege of refusing performance unless the other
performed or tendered, worked harshly as applied to cases where the
defaulting party had partly performed. Several mitigating doctrines
have been developed to counteract these effects. * * * The three prin-
cipal mitigating doctrines are: Substantial performance, severability
and quasi-contract. The first two are particular rules for the 'con-
struction' of the contract in a way which will avoid a penalty or for-
feiture; the third is a more direct attack upon the problem of unjust
enrichment."
10 See California Statute, CALUF. CIVIL CODE (Deering, 1949), §3275, supra
n. 30. In Bird v. Kenworthy, 265 P. 2d 943, 948 (Cal. App. 1954), reversed
on different grounds in 43 Cal. 2d 656, 277 P. 2d 1 (1954), a case involving
the sale of chattels, the California Court said it felt §3275 of the CIVIL CODE
should apply to sales of personalty as well as realty; that the primary
consideration is the avoidance of unjust enrichment at the expense of the
breaching party and therefore technical distinctions as to the types of con-
tracts or property should not be considered to obtain different results.
'Quillen v. Kelley, 216 Md. 396, 405, 140 A. 2d 517 (1958).
2 RESTATEMENT, CONTRACTS (1932) §357, comment (g) to Subsection (1),
p. 627, places the burden of proof upon the defaulting vendee to show "the
excess of the benefit received over the harm suffered." Also see 5 CORBIN,
CONTRACTS (1951) §§1124, 1132.
5 CORBIN, op. cit. ibid. 581, §1130, n. 63.
Ibid., 590-1, §1132. CoRBIN, at 591, fn. 74, cites Mintle v. Sylvester,
202 Iowa 1128, 211 N.W. 367 (1926), where the Iowa court allowed the
vendor to retain $35,000 paid under a contract to purchase realty for
$140,000. But see, Schwartz v. Syver, 264 Wis. 526, 59 N.W. 2d 489 (1953),
dis. op. 494, where plaintiff paid $500 (designated as "earnest money") on
a contract to purchase realty for a total price of $9,500, further payments
by installments not being made. Vendor resold for $11,000 and plaintiff
vendee sues for return of $500 which the majority of the Wisconsin court
disallowed, saying they were in accord with the modern trend against
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The conclusion is inescapable that in this state one who
contracts to purchase real property and, having partly per-
formed his promise to pay, finds that he is unable to go
through with the purchase, is in a vulnerable position. Even
assuming that the Court of Appeals will ultimately adopt
the view of RESTATEMENT, Section 357,17 that restitution
will be allowed in some circumstances, the Quillen case
points out a sizable gap in the relief this section38 pur-
ports to offer; precisely, that restitution is not available
to the vendee where the vendor still has a right to specific
performance, remaining ready and willing to perform. As
indicated above unbending application of such a limitation
could result in many cases in the "forfeiture" which the
RESTATEMENT seeks to avoid.
Undoubtedly, there is need of clarifying legislation to
define the rights of the parties in this area, for all claims
of defaulting vendees cannot be decided alike.3 9 Over
twenty years ago, Professor Simpson, after careful analysis
of the problem in a law review article, concluded:
"[T]he real need is for carefully drafted statutes, the
effect of which the courts will be unable to evade, and
which will compel them to deal with installment con-
tracts for the sale of land on the same equitable prin-
unjust enrichment to the vendor, but that the vendee here did not prove
the money paid exceeded just compensation to the vendor for damages, feel-
ing a showing of a resale by the vendor at an advance was not by itself
sufficient to establish unjust enrichment.
The dissent, p. 494, citing CORBIN'S article in 40 Yale L.J. 1013 [infra
n. 39], says that the plaintiff, lUy showing the defendant sold premises two
months later for $1,500 in excess of the original contract price, prima facie
established that the defendant had sustained no loss and it then devolved
upon the defendant to prove special damages in order for him to claim a
forfeiture of the plaintiff's down payment.
Commenting on the practice of setting a percentage that would be allowed
to be forfeited, the dissent, 494 said: "I see no reason why the principle of
unjust enrichment should not be applied to a $500 down payment as well
as to one of $5,000 in amount."
12 RESTATEMENT, CONTRACTS (1932) §357.
Ibid.
See note, Corbin, The Right of a Defaulting Vendee to the Restitution
of Installments Paid, 40 Yale L.J. 1013, 1014 (1931), where he says:
"Cases granting restitution and cases denying it can frequently be
reconciled on reasonable grounds. In statements of the law, however,
this is generally disregarded, the assumption being that all claims
by a defaulting vendee should be decided alike. On such an assumption
as this, it may be said that a very great majority of the cases have
refused restitution."
See also, Levin, Maryland Rule on Forfeiture Under Land Installment
Contracts . ..A Suggested Reform, 9 Md. L. Rev. 99, 129 (1948), where
the author proposes a statute for Maryland, entitled: "An Act to Regulate
Installment Contracts for the Purchase of Land."
OLIVER V. OLIVER
ciples which they apply without hesitation in the case
of transactions essentially similar in economic sub-
stance .... ",40
LYNN F. MEYEis
Custody Of Minor Children Awarded To Third Party
Or Guilty Parent Over Innocent
And Fit Parentt
Oliver v. Oliver' and Trenton v. Christ2
Mr. Oliver filed a bill against his wife for a divorce
a vinculo matrimonii on the grounds of abandonment and
adultery, and for the custody of their three year old
daughter. The Chancellor granted the husband an absolute
divorce for abandonment, but not for adultery, and awarded
custody of the child to the wife. The husband appealed
both the custody decree and the lower court's denial of a
divorce on grounds of adultery. The Court of Appeals, in
affirming the lower court's decree, held that, while there
might have been sufficient evidence to warrant a granting
of the divorce on grounds of adultery, custody was properly
awarded to the appellee.
The parties were married in 1950 and separated in 1954,
at which time the appellee took her infant daughter with
her. During that period, the appellee had become friendly
with a fellow employee, Taylor Potter. In 1955, upon tak-
ing an apartment in Wheaton, Maryland, "the wife and
Potter became involved in a companionship not consistent
with a normal friendship between a virtuous woman and
a continent man."3 A private detective, hired by the ap-
pellant and testifying in the lower court, described his
observations of appellee's intimate conduct with Potter at
her apartment, and further averred that on several occa-
sions Potter had visited the appellee at various hours
during the evening, not leaving for some period thereafter.
4Simpson, Legislative Changes in the Law of Equitable Conversion by
Contracts: II; 44 Yale L.J. 754, 779 (1935).
t Editor's Note. After the above casenote was written, the Court of
Appeals decided Melton v. Connolly, No. 145, September Term, 1958, ...
Md........ A. 2d ... (1959), in which, In awarding custody of a 5 year
old girl to foster parents, as against the father, the Court reaffirmed its
stand that the welfare of the child is the consideration of transcendent
Importance.1217 Md. 222, 140 A. 2d 908 (1958), dis. op. 230.
2216 Md. 418, 140 A. 2d 660 (1958).8 Supra, n. 1, 225-6.
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